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Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public
Officials, Social Networking, and
the Unmapped New Public Square
Bill Sherman*
Introduction
Your City Councilmember wants to connect with you. She
wants to hear from you, speak to you, allow you to get to know
her, and get to know you. She wants to learn your concerns and
interests, and discuss policy, politics, and issues big and small.
It is fair to say that she wants to develop a relationship with
you—one in which you share family photos, thoughts about
movies and the weather, and, of course, your views on issues
that will come before the City Council. In short, she wants to be
friends. But some local governments say she cannot—at least
not on Facebook.
It turns out that there are friends, and there are “friends.”
The use of online social networks by local public officials has
drawn the ire of local governments, some of whom have gone so
far as to bar public officials from social networks for fear of
violating campaign finance, open meeting, freedom of
information, and government ethics laws. These objections
overlook the unique nature of civic social networks as an
emerging political institution, characterized by a high degree of
transparency and intense public pressure for accountability.
The nature of this new institution renders the alarmist
reaction overblown. Civic social networks are the new public
square, and local governments should embrace them as

* Attorney, The Sherman Law Firm, PLLC. B.A., Wesleyan University;
J.D., University of Michigan. The author is a Commissioner on the City of
Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission, the agency that administers and
enforces the City‟s code covering Ethics, Elections, Whistleblower Protection,
and Lobbying. This Article reflects only the views of the author, and not those
of the Commission or the City of Seattle. © 2010 by Bill Sherman.
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consistent with the goals of open government and ethics laws.
This Article seeks to describe this emerging institutional
environment, and by doing so help change the ways that
policymakers apply open government and ethics rules to civic
social networks. Part One identifies the ways local public
officials and their constituents are using social networks. Part
Two discusses the attempts by some local governments to
eliminate or limit that use. Part Three uses public choice
theory and rational choice institutionalism to assess the tools
and behaviors that have given us the emerging institution of
civic social networks—an institution characterized by high
demand for transparency and accountability. Part Four argues
that the nature of the institution described in Part Three
demonstrates that the threatened enforcement of open
government and ethics laws would have a perverse effect—
reducing transparency and accountability while exposing
public officials to greater moral hazard. The Article concludes
with recommendations for open government and ethics statutes
(or the enforcement thereof) that would allow officials to
engage their constituents in the new public square of civic
social networks.
I. Welcome to the New Public Square
Local public officials are stampeding to use online social
networks. It should come as no surprise that people whose lives
are organized around constituent contact are adopting new
tools that let them reach large numbers of people at little cost.
But this scramble goes far beyond the use of formal,
government-created websites with press releases, updates, and
photos; today, it seems that there is hardly a mayor or city
councilmember in a major American city without a Facebook
page, a Twitter account, and a blog.1 Major policy
1. Of course, Facebook can be found at www.facebook.com; Twitter at
www.twitter.com; a “blog,” as surely everyone reading this Article knows, is a
contraction of the term “web log,” and can be hosted at any number of web
service companies, notably www.blogger.com. I will not attempt to offer a
comprehensive definition of online social media. For a superb and detailed
explanation of online social media, see James Grimmelmann, Saving
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announcements are made by tweet and entire town hall
meetings happen in chat rooms.2 But most interestingly, local
public officials have started using social networking in order to
connect with their constituents, creating a three-way
information flow: from official to constituent; from constituent
to official; and among constituents, but in the context of the
public official‟s network.3
This Part seeks to describe the use of online social
networks by public officials—civic social networks. It develops
the contrast between the network use envisioned by the
network enthusiasts and the local governments tasked with
enforcing open meeting, freedom of information, campaign
finance, and ethics laws, some of whom propose prohibiting or
limiting civic social network.
A.

Civic Social Networks: Optimists, Visionaries, and the
Promise of the New Public Square
Enthusiasts

envision

the

Internet

as

the

great

Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142-48 (2009). As I comment, infra, the
pace of change in social media is such that the specific platforms may be
quite unrecognizable in just a few years. See, e.g., Today Now!: Internet
Archeologists Find Ruins of “Friendster” Civilization, THE ONION NEWS
NETWORK
(Dec.
16,
2009),
http://www.theonion.com/video/internetarchaeologists-find-ruins-of-friendster-c,14389/.
2. Bill Dries, Wharton Vows Overhaul for Fleet Services, MEMPHIS DAILY
NEWS
(July
1,
2010),
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=51046
(describing Memphis Mayor A.C. Wharton Jr.‟s first virtual town hall
meeting); Keith Ervin, King County Budget Shortfall Rises to $90 million,
THE
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Sept.
5,
2008),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008160413_webkingbudget
05m.html (“[King County Executive Ron] Sims chose an unusual place to
release the news, through Twitter, an online social-networking service that
allows people to instantly post short messages in blog style.”); Michael Ray,
The Virtual World of Online Gaming, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ALMANAC
2008, at 8 (2008) (describing former Virginia Governor Mark Warner‟s virtual
town hall meeting on the social network platform Second Life in 2006).
3. This Article focuses on local public officials, a term meant to
encompass elected officials such as city council members, and also broad
enough to include appointed but still prominent local officials (for example, a
police chief or head of a major city department). I do not include in my
analysis candidates for public office, unless they are incumbents.
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democratizer—a place with free commerce in opinions and
ideas, where everyone is welcome, and where people gather to
hear announcements, to protest, or to celebrate. In this
optimistic conception, civic social networks are each
community‟s new public square.4
A physical public square is a common feature in a
community; in a city like Washington, D.C., it might be the
National Mall, and in a smaller town, it might be the village
square or the steps of city hall. Just as the physical public
square is many things—the locus of the distribution of official
information, part tribune and part question time, a place to
exchange information and news (and, yes, gossip, innuendo,
and misinformation), and a place where one is exposed to new
information—the new public square of civic social networks lets
anyone in. Public officials in the physical public square may
communicate with constituents or with each other, but such
communication occurs in full public view where it may be
interrupted, corrected, or seconded by an observing public; just
as in the new public square of civic social networks.
Social network sites have developed characteristics distinct
from the Internet at large. Danah Boyd and Nicole Ellison
define social network sites as “web-based services that allow
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse
their list of connections and those made by others within the
system.”5 The elegance of this definition lies in the
corresponding three types of social interactions that social
networks enable: the creation of an online identity; the
establishment of relationships between users; and the
development of layered communities defined by the lists of
4. Andrew Chadwick, Web 2.0: New Challenges for the Study of EDemocracy in an Era of Informational Exuberance, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR
INFO. SOC'Y 9, 15 (2009) (noting that it was assumed in the 1990s that
discussion forums “would provide for rich, critical, self-reflective, tolerant,
and sustained citizen engagement, elegantly expressed through the medium
of the written word”).
5. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC‟N 210, 211
(2007).
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connections each user establishes.6
The importance of these three types of interactions is the
story of the commercial Internet for the last ten years. But they
are equally important to politics and governance.7 Public
officials craft an online identity in order to provide certain
information or convey a certain brand or persona; constituents
do the same thing, although their primary target audience in
creating their online identity is more likely to be other
constituents, rather than the public official. Public officials and
constituents establish relationships among each other, and the
communities defined by lists of those relationships have both
direct communicative value (the ability to send and receive
content to/from the list) and secondary communicative value
(the ability to convey the size, content, level, and type of
activity of a network).8
At heart is a recognition that, as Justice Kennedy wrote,
“Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were.
To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of
ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and
electronic media.”9 This is borne out by empirical evidence
suggesting that online discourse has, in some ways, replaced
the old public square.10 Thus, it is up to the states and
6. See Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1151-59 (analyzing in great detail
this tripartite aspect of social networks).
7. Chadwick, supra note 4, at 19 (citing Tim O‟Reilly, What is Web 2.0?
Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software,
O‟REILLY (Oct. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web20.html). Among the many discussion of social media or “Web 2.0” in the
political context is Tim O‟Reilly‟s definition of the term “Web 2.0,” with seven
principles: the Internet as a platform for political discourse; the collective
intelligence emergent from political web use; the importance of data over
particular software and hardware applications; perpetual experimentalism in
the public domain; the creation of small scale forms of political engagement
through consumerism; the propagation of political content over multiple
applications; and rich user experiences on political websites. Id.
8. As Chadwick notes, “it seems safe to suggest that web 2.0 rests in part
upon a broadly voluntarist model of knowledge creation.” Id. at 21.
9. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 802-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment).
10. Optimists believe that use of civic social networks is linked to
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municipalities to conclude that, as Cass Sunstein puts it, “a
free society requires a right of access to areas where many
people meet.”11
B.

The Realists: Online Political Communication Ranges from
Discourse to Dysfunction

Civic social networks, one should not be surprised to
notice, do not look like an Athenian polis with Wi-Fi. But local
public officials and their constituents are flocking to social
networking tools,12 and even government agencies that recently
resisted have succumbed.13 The most popular tools appear to be
Facebook,14 Twitter,15 and blogs16 (some hosted by a third-party
greater civic engagement. KAREN MOSSBERGER, ET AL., DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP:
THE INTERNET, SOCIETY, AND PARTICIPATION (2007) (finding that chat rooms,
political email correspondence, and online news exposure predict higher
voting rates); John Brehm & Wendy Rahn, Individual-Level Evidence for the
Causes and Consequences of Social Capital, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 999 (1997); M.
Kent Jennings & Laura Stoker, Social Trust and Civic Engagement Across
Time and Generations, 39 ACTA POLITICA 342 (2004) (finding that political
engagement is linked, in part, to a structure that encourages group
membership, which in turn encourages trust).
11. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 25 (2007).
12. Carl E. Brody, Jr., Catch the Tiger by the Tail: Counseling the
Burgeoning Government Use of Internet Media, 84 FLA. BAR J. 52 (2009),
available at http://www.floridabar.org (“[L]ocal governments are beginning to
take advantage of the benefits of social networking.”); see generally Aaron
Smith, Government Online: The Internet Gives Citizens New Paths to
Government Services and Information, PEW INTERNET (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_Online_
2010_with_topline.pdf [hereinafter Government Online].
13. For example, last July, a Naples News story quoted a City of Marco
Island public information coordinator, Lisa Douglass, saying that the City
doesn‟t currently have any accounts with Websites, such as Facebook, and “I
don‟t foresee us having any in the future either.” Kelly Farrell, Attorneys,
Legislators to Pull Plug on Marco Government’s Use of Social Websites?,
NAPLES
NEWS
(July
7,
2009),
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/jul/07/attorneys-legislators-pull-plugmarco-governments-/; Cf. City of Marco Island Parks and Recreation,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Marco-Island-FL/City-of-MarcoIsland-Parks-and-Recreation/107921405922054 (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
14. See,
e.g.,
Houston
Mayor
Annise
Parker,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/MayorAnniseParker (last visited Nov. 11, 2010);
Seattle
Mayor
Michael
McGinn,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/michaelpatrickmcginn (last visited Nov. 11, 2010);
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service like Blogger, and some hosted directly from government
servers).
To be sure, many posts from public officials read like very
brief press releases: merely a pronouncement with little
genuine interaction between the official and the public.17 But
not all of them. In the snowstorm of 2010, Newark, New Jersey
Mayor Cory Booker famously responded to a tweet requesting
help removing snow by showing up with shovel in hand and
volunteers in tow.18 Booker, a mayor of a city with less than
300,000 residents, has more than 1,000,000 followers on
Twitter.19 The New York City Council‟s Twitter account
includes links to social networking posts by various
councilmembers and other City agencies and general news.20

San
Antonio
Mayor
Julián
Castro,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/MayorJulianCastro (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
15. See,
e.g.,
Los
Angeles
Mayor
Villaraigosa,
TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/VILLARAIGOSA (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/MayorDaley (last visited
Nov.
11,
2010);
Portland
Mayor
Sam
Adams,
TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/MayorSamadams (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
16. See, e.g., Gary Newsom, SAN FRANCISCO MAYOR GAVIN NEWSOM‟S
BLOG, http://sfmayor.typepad.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Manny Diaz,
MAYOR‟S BLOG, http://mayormannydiaz.blogspot.com/ (last visited Nov. 11,
2010); R.T. Rybak, THE MAYOR BLOG, http://themayorblog.com/ (last visited
Nov.
11,
2010);
Dave
Cieslewicz,
MAYOR
DAVE‟S
BLOG,
http://www.cityofmadison.com/mayor/blog/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010);
Antonio
Villaraigosa,
THE
BLOG,
http://mayor.lacity.org/MeettheMayor/TheBlog/index.htm (last visited Nov.
11, 2010).
17. See, e.g., Antonia Villaraigosa, TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:13 PM),
http://twitter.com/villaraigosa/status/21088633466 (“It was an honor to share
successful anti-gang strategies w the first black Prime Minister of Belize. LA
has a big Belizean population!”). Chicago Mayor Richard Daley now has a
Twitter account, available at http://twitter.com/MayorDaley, although
apparently he does not yet use email. Marcus Gilmer, Mayor Daley A-Twitter,
CHICAGOIST.COM
(Mar.
16,
2005,
11:15
AM),
http://chicagoist.com/2010/03/16/mayor_daley_a-twitter.php.
18. Eric Kuhn, Mayor Digs in After Twitter Appeal, CNN POLITICS
(January 3, 2010), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/03/mayor-digsin-after-twitter-appeal/.
19. Cory Booker, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/corybooker (last visited Oct.
14, 2010).
20. NYC Council, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/nyccouncil (last visited
Oct. 14, 2010).
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Houston Mayor Annise Parker‟s Facebook page includes
comment threads by constituents on subjects before the City,
and some replies by Mayor Parker (or her staff).21
In addition to specific city officials, some cities‟ agencies or
departments have aggressively adopted social media. The City
of Chicago lists 33 different social media accounts for its
agencies—not including any for City public officials other than
the mayor.22 In some cases, social media chases the officials
rather than the other way around. For example, British activist
volunteer group MySociety created websites, including
TheyWorkForYou and FixMyStreet that, like open source
maps, mashup government data with user-generated input to
connect constituents with problems, information, or interests to
each other and to public officials.23
So even if idealists hoping that social networks would
enable a high-minded process of deliberative democracy are
likely to be disappointed—after all, study after study has
demonstrated that online discourse is factually unreliable,
consists of opinion rather than objective information, creates
“echo chambers” in which people only talk to or hear from those
who already agree with them, and therefore reinforce
polarization in politics24—social networks have successfully
enabled low-threshold civic engagement by citizens and public
officials. As of 2010, a study showed that nearly one-third (31

21. Annise
Parker,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/MayorAnniseParker (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
22. Connect with the City of Chicago via Social Media, CITY OF CHICAGO,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/narr/misc/social_media.html (Last visited
Oct. 14, 2010). City officials such as Aldermen have Facebook accounts as
well. See, e.g., Joe Moore, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/joemoore49
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010); Danny Alderman, FACEBOOK, http://ptpt.facebook.com/pages/Alderman-Danny-Solis/112876165410079 (last visited
Oct. 14, 2010).
23. MYSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.mysociety.org (Last visited Oct. 14,
2010).
24. See generally Sunstein, supra note 11; see also William H. Dutton &
Malcolm Peltu, Reconfiguring Government-Public Engagements: Enhancing
the Communicative Power of Citizens, OXFORD INTERNET INST., 2007, at 12,
available at http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/publications/FD9.pdf (noting
that “[u]nregulated forums tend to become boxing rings for the extremes of an
argument”).
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percent) of online adults use online platforms such as blogs,
social networking sites, email, online video, or text messaging
to get government information, and 13 percent of Internet
users read a government agency or official‟s blog.25 Taken
together, nearly a quarter of Internet users have posted
comments or interacted with others online around government
policies or public issues.26 Civic social networks, like them or
not, are the new public square.
II. Ejecting Public Officials from the New Public Square
The rapid adoption of social networking tools by public
officials has left some local governments somewhat shellshocked. For those tasked with enforcing open meeting,
freedom of information, ethics, and campaign finance laws,
social networks are not so much a great new venue for
deliberative democracy, but more like new tools with which
public officials can misbehave. In many cases, local
governments have proposed restrictions that, for all intents
and purposes, ban public officials from using social networks in
their official capacity.27
A.

What is Government’s Role in Regulating Public Officials’
Presence in the New Public Square?

Policymakers have approached questions about public
officials‟ use of social networks in a manner consistent with
their institutional role. The question, for them, is whether the
activity occurring on social networks may violate existing law,
and if so, how best to stop and/or punish it.28 Because social
25. Government Online, supra note 12 at 26, 31.
26. Id. at 31.
27. See, e.g., Timothy Burgess, Councilmember, City of Seattle, Speech
at the Meeting of the Seattle Ethics and Elections Comm. (Dec. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.seattlechannel.org/videos/video.asp?ID=5590985.
“The draft rules [on social media use by city elected officials] from our staff
essentially would prohibit city councilmembers from using social media like
Facebook, Twitter, etc., and that‟s where I have a real objection.” Id.
28. As I explain in Part III, infra, this is not the only approach to the
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networks are, for the most part, third-party applications, their
features, format, and rules are not directly controlled by the
public officials or government agencies that use them.29
Consequently, any restrictions on use of social media by public
officials can only be enforced by monitoring and enforcement,
under threat of some penalty, rather than through design
modifications or access limitations.
It is fair to say that public officials cannot be counted upon
to govern themselves,30 especially when a significant portion of
the improper use of social networks may be inadvertent, and
therefore unlikely to be checked internally. But as with other
government regulation of the Internet, there is broad
disagreement about the specific role of government and civic
social networks.31
Local lawmakers and agencies with the responsibility to
enforce applicable laws have just begun to grapple with the
issue, but for policymakers tasked with enforcing existing law, it is to be
expected. As I argue below, I believe the issue would be better addressed with
an understanding that social networks are not just a tool public officials may
use or a venue in which they may act, but rather a set of behaviors that
constitute an emerging institution.
29. This stands in contrast to, for example, regulation of the use of a
government building, vehicle, or government-hosted website, all of which can
be controlled directly.
30. Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and
Rapprochement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
47 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O‟Connell eds., 2010). “Constant
emphasis on selfish strategic behavior in politics does pose dangers for the
public spirit. But designing institutions as if people always attempted to act
in the public interest is almost certainly a formula for disaster.” Id.
31. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Building the Bottom Up from the Top
Down, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 141, 145 (2009) [hereinafter
Building the Bottom Up].
[W]hat role is there for government to play in encouraging
the rise of new groups and new self-governing institutions?
Does it even make any sense to think of building the bottom
up from the top town, or is the role of academics and
especially policy-makers limited to that of participantobservers and cheerleaders waiting for the public to
spontaneously organize itself?
Id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a
Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 871 (2003).
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problems they see. The first reactions range from outright
hostility to any civic social networks to conservative counsel to
enthusiastic embrace.32 As one open-government advocate put
it, “[government prohibition on social network use] does exhibit
a trend we‟re seeing—leaders see social media as opening the
door for risk. But social media and improving online technology
is only going to make government more accessible. It is a
challenge but it is a challenge that‟s necessary for governments
to meet.”33
The challenge for local governments is to identify where
civic social networks extend, rather than subvert, valid public
goals like transparency and accountability. Thus, although
social networks “are occurring without government
intervention . . . there remains scope for government to nurture
them and especially to facilitate solutions to specific problems
that participants have not as yet been able to solve
themselves.”34 And as local governments identify problems and
facilitate solutions, they must recognize that social networks
are a form of engagement that citizens take seriously as a part
of their political expression.35 So far, however, those
governments have reacted in precisely the opposite way.
B. Ejecting Public Officials from the New Public Square
This is not the first time that a new technology has
emerged, forcing policymakers to assess its impact or threat. In
the case of social media, agencies have sounded the alarm, in
particular, over actual or potential violation of freedom of
information laws, open meetings laws, government ethics rules,
and campaign finance regulations. Because few (if any) laws
deal specifically with social networks, policymakers have had

32. See Brody, supra note 12.
33. R.L. Nave, When Politicians Tweet: Social Media’s Role in Open
Government,
SEATTLEPI.COM
(April
27,
2010,
6:57
PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/418990_socialpols27.html
(quoting
Sarah
Schacht, Executive Director for Knowledge as Power).
34. Building the Bottom Up, supra note 31, at 157.
35. Chadwick, supra note 4, at 39.
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to extrapolate from existing law, with mixed results.36
Policymakers have employed two different approaches.
Under the first approach, an agency has faced a specific
allegation that a use of civic social networks violates existing
law and the agency has then determined whether the existing
law applies to the use of social networks. Under the second
approach, a policymaking or enforcing agency has raised a
general alarm about the potential for mischief, and handed
down a series of rules intended to prevent violations. The
results have been varied, as demonstrated by the following
examples: (1) the City of Redondo Beach was advised to avoid
all use of social networks for any purposes;37 (2) the City of
Seattle was advised to adopt regulations that would bar City
Councilmembers from “friending” each other on social
networks, for fear of allowing inadvertent online meetings in
violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, and bar any links
that would lead to third-party content that is commercial (like
advertisements) or political (like a comment from a constituent
in support of a campaign);38 (3) Attorneys for a Florida
municipal planning board told the board that, as a general
matter, it should not have a social network profile “under any
circumstances”;39 (4) Attorneys for a collection of Washington
36. Brody, supra note 12, at 54.
Though the realm of Internet media is evolving at light
speed, it remains tethered to statutory laws that have been
around for decades . . . [and] state courts have yet to fully
engage on subjects specific to local government
requirements and, therefore, at times there is a need to
extrapolate as to the application of state law to Internet
social networking.
Id.
37. Sascha Bush, City Council Wrap, THE BEACH REP., (Aug. 18, 2010,
5:36
PM),
http://www.tbrnews.com/articles/2010/08/19/redondo_beach_news/news11.txt.
38. Ramsey Ramerman & Walter Neary, Social Media: Stepping Out of
the Box. Staying in the Lines, ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON CITIES ANNUAL
CONFERENCE
31
(2010),
available
at
http://www.awcnet.org/trainmaterials/conference/2010/SocialMediaPresentati
on.pdf [hereinafter Stepping Out].
39. Kelly Farrell, Attorneys, Legislators to Pull Plug on Marco
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cities advised city councilmembers to avoid posting any content
regarding policy or city-related issues;40 and (5) counsel for the
City of Fort Lauderdale discouraged any City participation on
Facebook or “any similar interactive communication
technology.”41
Agencies, counsel, and public officials have grappled with
at least three types of potential statutory violations that they
believe apply to communications among public officials and
constituents using social networks.
1. Freedom of Information or Public Records Acts
Skeptics point out that public officials‟ use of social
network sites can create public records that are inaccessible to
many members of the public in their original location, and may
not be retained or cataloged in the same way as email or
written correspondence. Those concerns are well justified.
Consider the following scenario: Councilmember Jones posts on
Twitter that he opposes Mayor Smith‟s plan to combat street
crime: “I stand against @MayorSmith‟s faulty, punitive
#brokenwindows
plan.
Let‟s
make
our
streets
#safeforeveryone!” The post would be published online42 and
anyone who had a Twitter account who had signed up to follow
Councilmember Jones would instantly receive the message (as
would anyone signed up to follow Mayor Smith and anyone
searching
for
the
hashtags
#brokenwindows
or
#safeforeveryone). In addition, those who do not have Twitter
accounts may view the post for a certain period of time, but
would not receive a notification when it was posted.
This raises two questions: First, is Councilmember Jones‟s

Government’s Use of Social Websites?, NAPLESNEWS.COM (July 7, 2009, 1:42
PM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/jul/07/attorneys-legislators-pullplug-marco-governments-/?printer=1/.
40. Stepping Out, supra note 38, at 18-19.
41. Memorandum No. 09-0524 from Harry A. Stewart, City Attorney, Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla., to Mayor, Vice Mayor, and Commissioners, Update on the
Law—Facebook Pages and Websites (May 14, 2009), available at
http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/broward/blog/facebookmemo.rtf.
42. Twitter posts are limited to 140 characters; the above post is 109.
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tweet a public record? And second, if so, how would it be found,
retained, and produced by the City in response to a public
records or Freedom of Information Act request?
All fifty states have public records statutes, many modeled
after the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).43 These
laws were a cornerstone of the “sunshine laws” movement that
began in the 1950s and flourished in the post-Watergate era,
opening government records to public access on the theory that
sunshine is the best disinfectant44—that is, public scrutiny
exposes, and therefore hampers or remedies, corruption.
Briefly, these statutes require the government to provide
public records upon request (with certain enumerated
exceptions). Public records are generally defined as any writing
or other record containing information relating to the conduct
of government prepared, owned, used, or retained by any part
of the government.45
The key legal questions are well-settled; a public official‟s
writings, regardless whether they are on a government website
or not, are public records, so long as the post is pertinent to city
business.46 The harder question, then, is not the legal but the
practical one: how best can the government retain a record of
officials‟ posts on social media so that they can be produced
upon request under FOIA?
Seen as a collection of written exchanges, the retention and

43. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy
and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002). “Today, all fifty
states have open records statutes, a majority of which are modeled after the
[Federal Freedom of Information Act].” Id.
44. This phrase is attributed to Justice Louis Brandeis. See LOUIS
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE‟S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914)
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”).
45. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) (2007).
46. The common reasoning is well described by the Florida Attorney
General‟s Office—when a public official chooses to use a non-government
means of communication (whether email or social networks), then he or she
agrees that they have supervision and control over the document, and has a
duty of preservation and disclosure. Brody, supra note 12, at 55; see also
Nave, supra note 33. “Most states, including Washington, have determined
that social media activity by government agencies—despite the fact that it
takes place on privately owned third-party Web services—does fall under the
purview of the state‟s Public Records Act.” Nave, supra note 33.
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production of social network posts is not conceptually
difficult—they are not distinguishable from email. “An
ordinary email is nothing more than a piece of written
correspondence transmitted through an efficient and
inexpensive means. . . . [T]he public‟s interest in overseeing the
workings of local government is protected in the same way that
it is for call other types of written correspondence—the public
may review such correspondence by making a records request
under the open records provision of state law.”47
A trickier problem arises due to the lack of permanency of
social network posts. Consider this scenario: A port
commissioner criticizes a city councilmember‟s policy proposal
in a post on Facebook; the other councilmember responds by
posting something on the port commissioner‟s Facebook page.
For some reason (perhaps the commissioner regrets his tone, or
decides that this disagreement need not be public, or realizes
he was wrong), he removes the original Facebook post, and
deletes the response posted by the city councilmember.48
Now, it may be good for the tone of public discourse, and
maybe even for policy, for these officials to be able to turn back
the clock to the moment before they hit the “post” or “share”
button. But the law is clear that both the original post and the
response are public records, and it is certainly in the public
interest for voters to have access to the writings of their elected
officials on policy matters.
Difficult as these questions are, they are essentially
technical problems. The right retention tools can ensure that
all of these writings, wise and unwise, are available for
production in response to FOIA requests. Inexpensive solutions
exist that would allow a public official (or her staff) save a
weekly log of Facebook, Twitter, and blog posts.49

47. John F. O‟Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly Required:
The Application of State Open Meeting Laws to Email Correspondence, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 722 (2004).
48. This example is not hypothetical. See, e.g., Erica C. Barnett, The
Disappearing O’Brien-Creighton Facebook Flap, PUBLICOLA (July 30, 2010),
http://www.publicola.net/2010/07/30/the-disappearing-obrien-creightonfacebook-flap/.
49. See, e.g., PAGE FREEZER, http://pagefreezer.com/ (last visited Nov. 15,
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2. Open public meetings
A knottier problem arises under open meeting statutes.
Because public officials can read each others‟ tweets, blog
posts, and Facebook updates in real time and respond to them
instantaneously, they may engage in communication that is
more similar to a meeting than it is to ordinary
correspondence. Consider a slight twist on the hypothetical
Twitter post above: City Councilmember Jones posts his
opposition to the mayor‟s public safety policy on Facebook.
Among two dozen reader comments are the following:
Councilmember Nguyen clicks the “like” button on the post—
signaling to all readers that he agrees with Councilmember
Jones; Councilmember Diaz comments on the post that she
thinks the mayor‟s policy does not go far enough;
Councilmember Rogers writes that he disagrees with
Councilmember Jones but is open to persuasion; and
Councilmember O‟Connor links to Councilmember Jones‟s post
on her own Facebook page and comments that the entire
question is moot because the public safety budget is strapped.50
Did a city council meeting just take place on Facebook?
Open meeting statutes have existed in every state and the
District of Columbia for over thirty years.51 These laws require
that most meetings of city or county councils, as well as
government-authorized boards and commissions, be held with
notice to and access for the public. The laws can have quite
powerful enforcement mechanisms; commonly, the remedies for
violation include individual penalties for the officials,
municipal liability for any costs and fees, and reversal of the
government action that was the subject of the meeting.52

2010); BACKUPIFY, http://www.backupify.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
50. I use Facebook purely as an example; a nearly identical exchange
could take place on Twitter or in the comments section of a blog post.
51. See, e.g., Susan T. Stephenson, Note, Government in the Sunshine
Act: Opening Federal Agency Meetings, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 154, 154 n.3 (1976);
Teresa D. Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the
Sunshine in the 1990s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1165, 1167 (1993).
52. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.060 & .120 (2006).
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Open meeting statutes are universally interpreted to cover
not only in-person, face-to-face meetings but also so-called
“serial” meetings and meetings at which communication is
done in writing or by telephone.53 More recently, comparable
communication by email—when it is interactive, deliberative,
or decisionary in nature, occurs close in time and involves a
quorum of the relevant government body—has been held to
violate open meeting laws.54
While few, if any, court decisions apply open meeting laws
to social networking, local governments see social networks as
a particular risk because their structure is designed to
facilitate casual interaction. For example, posts from “friends”
or contacts automatically appear on an official‟s profile and it
takes only a single click to interact with the author. Thus, if
open meeting laws were applied to civic social networks, a
“meeting” could occur without any single official intending it.
After all, these sites were developed, in part, to create virtual
space in which users could “meet” with a minimum of effort.55
The first state supreme court to address the applicability of
open meeting laws to email focused its analysis on whether the
email exchange had “indicia of simultaneity” that indicate
government deliberation occurring in real time, but virtual
space.56 Some other courts do not appear to find significant the
53. See Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Members of The Redevelopment
Agency, 214 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562, 564 (1985) (holding that series of telephone
calls between individual members and attorneys constitute a “meeting” so as
to violate the California public meeting law).
54. See Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 27 P.3d 1208 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001); but see Beck v. Shelton, 593 S.E.2d 195, 201 (Va. 2004) (holding that
the e-mail communications in this case “did not constitute a meeting”).
55. Arguably, the hosting sites are fully open to the public for most
online posts, insofar as the interested citizen can access the post without
registration, such as for Twitter or a blog, of if registration is free and simple
(the case with Facebook). But the user agreements for Facebook are not
simple; one gives up a certain amount of valuable information to Facebook,
and agrees to terms of use that some find objectionable. Furthermore, in
order to obtain the desired level of access, one may have become a “follower”
(on Twitter) or a “friend” or “fan” (on Facebook) of a public official, essentially
declaring support before even seeing what they have to say.
56. O‟Connor, supra note 47, at 721; see also Beck, 593 S.E.2d at 198
(stating that the “e-mail communications did not involve virtually
simultaneous interaction”).
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differences between written communication and in-person
deliberations.57 Generally, however, state courts agree that
electronic communications like conference calls and email
exchanges can constitute a meeting under certain
circumstances.58
In some significant ways, an exchange between officials on
a civic social network such as Facebook or Twitter is different
from an email exchange. For example, an exchange in the
comments to a blog post on Facebook or Twitter is available for
anyone to see or join at any time, although there may not be a
“feasible way for any and all interested members of the public
to „attend‟ an email communication.”59 In fact, the transparency
of the exchange and its openness to public participation is
arguably as great or greater than most traditional public
meetings. And, as a general matter, the overlapping purposes
of FOIA laws (ensuring that government records, including
correspondence, is available to the public) and open meetings
laws (ensuring that deliberation is public and that constituents
can engage in the deliberation) are fully accomplished in the
social networking context in a way that they are not in an
email exchange, which must be requested formally to be

57. See Wood, 27 P.3d at 1216 (in which the court did not place great
significance in the immediacy of the exchange); see also O‟Connor, supra note
47, at 745-46 (“The Wood court gave no apparent consideration to the fact
that email communications differ from orthodox meetings in that the
participants are not deliberating at the same time or in the same place.
Rather, the result depended entirely on the substance of the communications
and whether the communications involved „the active exchange of
information and opinions‟ on a matter of public business—which would be
illegal—or „the mere passive receipt of information‟—which would not be
illegal.”).
58. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-20 (West 2010) (Illinois includes
any event with “contemporaneous interactive communication” as a meeting
under the Open Meetings Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-200(2) (West 2010)
(Connecticut defines “meeting” as “any hearing or other proceeding of a
public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember
public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember
public agency, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, to
discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision,
control, jurisdiction or advisory power.”).
59. O‟Connor, supra note 47, at 753.
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received.60
Under the current interpretations of open public meeting
statutes, exchanges like the hypothetical above would almost
certainly be prohibited. But rather than seek an alternative
interpretation of the law, or even merely train members to
avoid a violation, social media skeptics are throwing the baby
out with the bathwater. The City of Seattle, for example, is
considering a policy that would “strongly discourage[]” city
Councilmembers from “friending” each other at all—a solution
akin to preventing email exchanges or telephone calls between
members.61 Other governments are advising officials to stay off
social networks altogether.62
3. Misuse of Public Resources and Political Content
Policymakers are particularly concerned about the
potential for government links to social network sites that
contain political, non-government, or advertising content.
Although social network sites are not owned by the
government, if the government‟s website has a direct link to
the social network, then government resources can be
interpreted as supporting the content of the social network site.
This creates a risk of the illegal use of government resources.63
60. See, e.g., Stephen Schaeffer, Comment, Sunshine in Cyberspace?
Electronic Deliberation and the Reach of Open Meeting Laws, 48 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 755, 778 (2004) (discussing 00-906 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (2001) and 200166 Fla. Op. Att‟y Gen. 1 (2001)).
61. “Communication between Councilmembers via social media, as with
telephone and email, may constitute a „meeting‟ under the Open Public
Meetings Act. For this reason, Councilmembers are strongly discouraged
from „friending‟ other Councilmembers.” Sample Policy: Use of Social Media
by
City
Council
Members,
SEATTLE
LEGISLATIVE
DEP‟T,
http://www.mrsc.org/policyprocedures/s42ccsocialmedia.pdf
[hereinafter
Sample Policy] (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
62. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 37; Farrell, supra note 39; Memorandum
No. 09-0524, supra note 41; Stepping Out, supra note 38.
63. Memorandum from Wayne Barnett, Executive Director, Seattle
Ethics and Elections Commission on Social Media and the Ethics and
Elections
Codes
2
(Nov.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.seattle.gov/ethics/meetings/2009-12-02/item7.pdf (noting that
government websites are public facilities, and that “using state facilities to
provide a direct electronic link to a private web page which contains
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Consider this scenario: Mayor Smith has an official web
page at his city‟s main website. On that page, there is a sidebar
encouraging readers to follow the mayor on his blog, Twitter,
Facebook, and Flickr, with links to those sites.64
For the purpose of our analysis, assume that the mayor‟s
blog, Twitter feed, Facebook page, and Flickr account are not
managed using government funds but by the mayor himself or
a volunteer. Further, assume that the blog is on Blogger or a
similar third-party site. May the mayor endorse a candidate for
office on his Twitter feed? May he post a photo of himself at a
political rally on Flickr? These examples seem pretty
straightforward; he may not, because doing so would result in
city resources directly linking to campaign content posted by a
city official.65
But civic social networks, by design, invite participation
from the public, not just dispatches from officials, and are
supported by advertising revenues. If the main city website
includes direct links to the mayor‟s Facebook page, is it
permissible for the Facebook page to feature commercial
advertisements? What if a constituent posted a campaignrelated message on the mayor‟s Facebook page, or tagged the
mayor in a campaign-related Twitter post or photo on Flickr?
State laws universally bar the use of government resources
to support a private individual or enterprise, or a political
campaign.66 Because government websites are maintained with
public funds, a link from a government website to a social
network site can run afoul of this prohibition—depending on
the content of the social network site.67
materials and advertisements that support, or oppose, passage of a ballot
initiative would also violate” state law).
64. Seattle
Mayor
Michael
McGinn,
SEATTLE.GOV,
http://seattle.gov/mayor/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
65. Barnett, supra note 63, at 2.
66. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (barring the government from
using, giving, or lending its taxing power or credit to aid any private interest
or individual).
67. Brody, supra note 12, at 57. “Most Internet networking created by
elected officials is in some way intended to advance the private interests of
the official in retaining his or her current position or for obtaining greater
support at the polls.” Id. “Local government Web sites require public funds to
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Local governments raise a number of serious concerns.
Consider the following scenarios: (A) A city‟s official web page
includes links to Facebook pages maintained by public officials
or city agencies. Facebook, as a private company, is enjoying
the benefit of any user traffic driven to its site; (B) a city‟s
official web page includes links to a blog or Facebook page
maintained by a public official or city agency. The blog or
Facebook page includes commercial advertising, and therefore
is promoting certain businesses; and (C) A city
councilmember‟s official web page includes a link to his or her
Facebook page. The councilmember is fastidious about avoiding
posting any campaign-related content on that site. But, without
the consent of the councilmember, Facebook displays political
ads for various candidates along the right margin of the page,
and constituents of the councilmember post material on the
page promoting certain candidates.68 For each of these
scenarios, does the city‟s link constitute an improper use of
government resources?
Policymakers and enforcers tend to view scenarios A and B
as allowable for any or all of three reasons: (1) any support of
the social network site or advertiser is de minimis; (2) any
support is unintentional; and (3) any support is a byproduct of
an allowable government activity or a government purpose (in
this case, the purpose would be public outreach and
communication). From a practical standpoint, this makes good
sense—after all, if a government link to a corporate website or
a website containing advertising was prohibited, then a county
could never link to an online newspaper article.
Scenario C, however, is problematic because support of a
political campaign can never be a permissible government

be maintained. Therefore, any elected official desiring to link his or her Web
site to the site of any public entity could potentially be in violation of Fla.
Const. Art VII, § 10 . . . as arguably the elected official would be exploiting
public funds for his or her own private benefit. Particularly in an election
year where campaign material and messages will undoubtedly be promoted
partially through networking sites, the risk for inadvertently violating these
provisions is high.” Id.
68. Facebook‟s placement of ads is more likely to be tied to the profile of
the viewer, not the Councilmember.
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purpose.69 The difficulty of this scenario lies in the notion that
the political content can appear on the public official‟s social
network site without being posted or approved by the public
official. Moreover, depending on the social network‟s specific
features, the public official may not even be able to remove the
material from the social network.
Regulators indicate that their preferred solution would
require public officials to moderate the content on their social
network pages to prevent political content from appearing. This
assumes, first, that the public official has some control over the
content—which he may not—and second, imposes on the public
official the need to police the social network site for
inappropriate material. The analogy used by some regulators
was summarized by the executive director of the Seattle Ethics
and Elections Commission:
Just as it would violate the Elections Code for a
City officer or employee to authorize a campaign
rally in a City conference room, so too would it
violate the elections Code if a City officer or
employee permitted the public to hold a virtual
campaign rally in the comments thread on a blog
accessible from a City site. In both cases, City
resources are being used for unlawful purposes,
which the City official has authorized.70
Thus, a public official would be prohibited from using any
civic social network that could allow other users to post
political material.

69. The scenario described is not unique to Facebook. A constituent (or
anyone) could post campaign-related material on Twitter and, by tagging the
public official, it would show up in the official‟s Twitter feed; similarly, a
constituent could post campaign-related material in the comments thread of
a blog post.
70. Barnett, supra note 63, at 5.
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Why the Solutions Offered by Local Governments Do not
Work

Ill-crafted approaches offered by policymakers and
enforcers, such as barring social network use at all, prohibiting
councilmembers from “friending” each other, or holding public
officials responsible for third-party content, result in
impractical solutions. Regulators have addressed social
networks by applying existing law to a possible problem, and
attempting to extrapolate a solution based on previous
applications of the law to email, conference calls, and
conference rooms in government buildings.
The result of such extrapolations has been a contradictory
collection of rules attempting to patch specific problems. For
example, the U.S. Senate Internet Services Usage Rules and
Policies permit Senators to maintain a third-party website—
such as a blog or Facebook page—but only one that does not
permit “personal, promotional, commercial or partisan
political/campaign-related content or links to an Officemaintained website or channel.”71 Thus, a senator cannot
maintain a social network site with personal information and it
cannot link back to his or her official Senate website. Such a
policy, in an attempt to avoid possible conflicts with existing
rules, establishes new rules that are certain to be ignored; it
takes seconds to find a senator‟s Facebook page featuring
promotional, commercial, and personal content or with links to
an office-maintained website.72
Local governments‟ solutions are also often internally
inconsistent. For example, Seattle‟s draft policy encourages city
councilmembers to use social media that can record the
identity of a commenter and restrict users‟ ability to comment,
most often done by requiring registration (i.e., Blogger/Google‟s
71. U.S. Senate Internet Services Usage Rules and Policies, SENATE.GOV,
http://www.senate.gov/usage/internetpolicy.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
72. See,
e.g.,
Senator
Mitch
McConnell,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Senator-MitchMcConnell/20163125303?ref=ts (last visited Nov. 15. 2010); Mitch McConnell,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/mitchmcconnell (last visited Nov. 15,
2010).
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registration requirement). Yet the policy, mere lines later,
states that, “[s]ites requiring membership or subscription
should be avoided.”73 This not only contradicts the desire for
control that can only come with registration, but also rules out
the majority of popular social networking sites, such as
Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter.
Fundamentally, the failure of open meeting and campaign
laws to address social networks stems from these local laws‟
approach: they deal with social networks as if they are only a
tool with which officials act in ways similar to the tools
available in 1976. Consequently, it is a mistake to assume that
our existing rules will apply to social networks with a couple of
tweaks. Scenario C described above (dealing with the
regulation of third-party content) demonstrates that the
existing rules fail to address much of the most problematic, and
hardest to police, behavior. I suggest that the challenge is not
to develop micro-rules that would prevent this behavior, but
instead to step back and take a close look at the behavioral
norms and pressures that are developing around this
institution, and see what it is we are dealing with.
The failure of policymakers to develop guidelines that
make sense for civic social networks is not surprising since it is
impossible to predict the specific shape of social networks or
how they will interact with public officials in the future. As
Jerry Mashaw put it, “we do not really have much information
about how to design institutions that take the taste-shaping
aspects of public action seriously. We know very little about
how institutional taste shaping works.”74 Nevertheless, if we
are to understand the opportunities and risks that social
networks offer public officials and their constituents, we have
to understand the environment that has led to their extremely
rapid adoption and the patterns of behavior that have
developed around their use. As I argue in Part III, these
behaviors have become so pronounced that they have begun to
take the shape of a new unstructured institution—not an

73. Sample Policy, supra note 61.
74. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 28 (1997).
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organization, but rather a set of interrelated strategic
behaviors that, in turn, affects the behavior around it.
III.

Social Networks Are a New Institutional Environment

Social networking by public officials and their constituents
has exploded in the last four years,75 but the most astonishing
aspect of civic social network is not their rapid adoption,
usefulness, or ability to facilitate different kinds of
communication. The most striking aspect of this phenomenon
is that the behaviors on all sides of the communication
matrix—that is, among both officials and constituents—already
have recognizable patterns and norms of such consistency that
they constitute an emerging unstructured institution. This
Part argues that policymakers must understand the
characteristics of this institution if they are to regulate public
officials‟ use of social networks.
A.

Social Networking as a Public Choice and Rational Choice
Institutionalism Topic

An analysis of the pressures on and behavior of public
officials and their constituents demonstrates that social
networks are more than simply new venues in which public
officials and their constituents act. Rather, social networks
have a distinct social logic driven by the self-interested
behavior of users.76
Although there are many ways to examine political
behavior, social networking is especially appropriate for the
use of public choice theory and rational choice institutionalism;
the environment involves a very large number of low-threshold
but distinct decisions, and each of these decisions indicates an
75. See generally Smith, supra note 12. The timing has many sources,
but the single largest contributor is apparently the expansion of Facebook in
2006 from college students (or anyone with a .edu email address) to the
public at large.
76. See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008). Shirky‟s book describes in great
and entertaining detail the underlying logic of social networks.
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expression of specific desires on behalf of the user. When a
public official or a constituent decides to begin, continue, or
expand the use of online social networking—whether to sign in,
to send a message, to post information, or to organize a group—
the decisions involve individual calculations about the use of
time, attention, and communication. And because the specific
sites and tools employed today are certain to change quickly
and dramatically, it is important to apply tools of analysis that
do not take as a constant any feature of this environment other
than the aggregated preferences and decisions of the users.
Consequently, this Part applies tools from public choice
theory and rational choice institutionalism77 to assess the
incentives, costs, and emerging institutional characteristics
driving the behavior of public officials and their constituents
when using social networks. Public choice theory takes some
well-deserved criticism for its assumption of purely rational
and selfish behavior; Professor Mashaw demonstrates (with
devastating effectiveness) the frequent inability of public choice
to explain even common political behavior.78 By applying these

77. I do not mean to suggest that public choice or rational choice is the
only way to understand public officials and social networks. “Public choice is
not the sole method of analysis of a given legal problem. However, it can
serve to enrich the analytical framework of law and legal institutions. Some
features of law that seem puzzling to traditional analytical approaches can be
explained by public choice analysis.” D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the
Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009)).
78. Mashaw, supra note 30. Mashaw demonstrates that public choice
theory does not appear to describe how law actually gets made at all, and
fails to agree on enough of the key questions to not be of much use. But I
think that Mashaw takes public choice theory perhaps too seriously, in a way
(or maybe it is the theorists who take their own work too seriously, and
Mashaw does them the honor of responding in kind). I view public choice as a
series of theories that seek to describe forces at work in law and democracy,
but do not claim to be the only forces or the only applicable theories. By
analogy, Newton‟s Law of Gravity is no less true for the fact that mountains
rise and clouds stay aloft, unexplained by gravity; it is just that those
phenomena require more than one theory to explain their existence and
behavior. In the same way, public choice theory can help explain why social
networks, as applied to public officials, has developed as an unstructured
institution. It can help explain the ways that institution may change in the
future, and the ways that government may police the ways that it is used by
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tools, I do not suggest that they are the only way to look at this
problem, or that they explain everything. But public choice
does identify and explain a number of the more interesting
features of the use of social networks by public officials, and
the deficiencies and potential of policymakers‟ efforts to
regulate it. 79
The most basic assumptions of public choice theory are
that the relevant actors have an identifiable set of preferences
or tastes, that they behave so as to maximize the attainment of
those preferences, and that they do so strategically.80 In this
case, the key actors are public officials and their constituents,
both of whom use (or are interested in using) social networks.
The actors share some of the same incentives in their behavior,
and are divergent in others. But primary among those shared
are what Professor Grimmelmann refers to as the “social
imperatives” of “identity, relationships, and community.”81 It is
those “imperatives” and the underlying logic of social networks
that makes them important to understand for policymakers
seeking to regulate public officials‟ conduct. As Grimmelmann
notes, “[w]e cannot and should not beat these social urges out
of people; we cannot and should not stop people from acting on
them. . . . New technologies matter when they change the
dynamics of how people do things together; the challenge for
technology law is always to adapt itself to these changing
dynamics.”82
Even with those “social imperatives,” any individual‟s
decision to use social networking faces questions familiar to

public officials.
79. As Sokol explains, “[u]nderstanding public choice allows actors in the
legal and political systems to better understand policy trade-offs and
implications. With this knowledge, such actors can make decisions more
likely to maximize social welfare.” Sokol, supra note 77 (citing Mashaw,
supra note 74, at 31).
80. Mashaw, supra note 30 (“As has been noted, the crucial unifying
thread in public choice theory is the assumption that all actors in political
life—voters, interest groups, representatives, legislative committees,
bureaucrats or courts—behave rationally to maximize or optimize some
objective function (wealth, status, power).”).
81. Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 1206.
82. Id.
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public choice. Rational choice institutionalists see politics as a
set of collective action dilemmas, or situations in which a group
of individuals trying to maximize their own desired outcome
are likely, through their aggregated individual action, to
produce an outcome that is collectively less than optimal. The
question then is framed as how institutions are created or
governed that affect the collective action problem (whether by
overcoming it, changing the type of problem, or exacerbating
it). In our example—online social networking—the questions
are: how and why did online social networks arise in the
political context? Why do people find them useful? And what
does their growth say about the wisdom of restrictions on their
use by public officials?
The best way to understand how social networks function
in conjunction with public officials is to understand the
behavior of the two types of actors in the relationship: public
officials and their constituents.
B. Why Do Public Officials Want to Use Social Networks?
Social scientists who examine social networking by public
officials sometimes view the dynamic between the government
and the public as a relationship between supply of information
(by public officials) and demand (by constituents).83 Although
that framework may help describe certain ways that the
government and public interact on the Internet, it bears little
resemblance to the social networking environment, which
features much more give-and-take on both sides. In fact, an
analysis of social network sites that fails to recognize the
demand by officials of others in the network will miss the ways
that officials‟ behavior helps solve many of the collective action
problems that may otherwise stymie widespread use by the
public. Consequently, this subsection assesses values and
tastes that prompt public officials to use social networks; the
specific behavior in which those values and tastes are

83. See Chadwick, supra note 4, at 26. Chadwick refers to the “demand
side—the perspective of citizens” and the “supply side—the perspective of
government organizations.” Id.
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manifested; the forces that their behavior brings to bear on
other users of social networks; and the ways that behavior of
public officials is restrained (by themselves or other factors).
1. Why Do Public Officials Use Social Networks?
Public choice theory traditionally takes a very dim view of
the motivations of public officials. Generally, elected officials
are portrayed as valuing re-election above all else; for
appointed officials, the expansion of budget and power is
paramount.84
Debunking, explaining, and expanding this view of the
motivations of public officials has been a minor industry for
decades. The upshot of this research, both theoretical and
empirical, has been that re-election, budget, and power are all
important goals of public officials, but that such a view
oversimplifies a very complex and layered collection of values.
For example, in his books Congressmen in Committees and
Home Style, Richard Fenno, Jr. highlighted as additional goals
the desire for reputation among other elected officials, the hope
of election to higher office, and the accomplishment of stated
legislative goals (in the abstract), and the notion of a legacy.85
Surely it is not difficult to identify behavior of public
officials that appears to satisfy these goals, whether cynical or
laudably civic in nature. But what specifically does a public
official value that might prompt him or her to use social
networks and affect how he or she might use them?
Most obviously, officials value the ability to distribute
information to a large number of people. There are specific
qualities or types of mass communication that carry greater
value; for example, public officials value in particular the
ability to send a desired message; the ability to send it to a
84. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971).
85. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973);
RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS
(1978); see also Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the
Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw out that Baby,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 322 (2002).

29

124

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

specific group of people (supporters, persuadable voters, people
in a particular geographic area); and the ability to get the
recipients to actually read/view/hear the message. Closely
related is the effectiveness of the message—in other words, the
ability to get the recipient to act in the manner intended.
All of the above examples, however, deal only with
outbound connections, or the broadcast from the public official
to constituents. But public officials value more than merely
outbound messages, no matter how targeted and effective; they
also value inbound connections. An inbound connection or
communication is valued at several levels. First, it has value
for the information that the content conveys—for example
support or opposition on a particular issue, or substantive
information about a matter that may come before the official
for a decision. Second, it has value for the information conveyed
by the sender‟s identity; public officials want to know who,
specifically, is in contact with their office and why. Third, the
inbound connection may have secondary power that the receipt
of such messages gives the public official (that is, a public
official may value the ability to claim he has received a number
of inquiries or communications on a subject). Fourth, the
connection may be valuable because of the opinion or
information it delivers. And fifth, the inbound connection
carries significance as an indicator of a much stronger
relationship between the constituent and the public official.
In addition, public officials value highly their reputation or
public image and the ability to control that public image.
Among the aspects of image that a public official may value are
the appearances of sincerity, deliberation, principle, and
interest or concern in any individual problem or issue. To the
extent that a public official can fine-tune his or her reputation
or public image, he or she will value the tools that allow it.
From a public choice perspective, a public official‟s
behavior should demonstrate that he or she also wants to fulfill
all of these goals, values, and desires, to the extent possible,
without a minimum of effort or expense—and, if at all possible,
shifting any effort or expense onto someone else.86 In other
86. In the parlance of public choice theory, public officials (and everyone
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words, to the extent that the public official can obtain her goals
without having to give up anything, all the better. Thus, we
should expect to see public officials use social networks only to
the extent that: (a) they can free ride on others‟ efforts, thus
avoiding a collective action problem; (b) they can capture the
fruits of others‟ labor, therefore making any remaining effort or
expenditure lesser than the projected benefit; or (c) the
remaining potential benefits still outweigh the costs of full
individual efforts.
2. How Do Public Officials Use Social Networks?
To a significant degree, the private sector has invested in
the software infrastructure that greatly lowers the threshold
for public officials (or anyone) to use social networking.
Companies like Facebook, Twitter, News Corp. (owner of
MySpace), and Google (owner of Blogger) have made available
social networking software at no or very low cost and
established business models that benefit primarily from large
numbers of users (generally, advertising). These two factors—
the establishment multiple social networking platforms and
the existence of a large number of people to connect to on those
platforms—remove two of the most obvious investment
problems for public officials (who could not individually create
the software and would have no use for social networks if they
were not already populated).
The wide spectrum of possible social networking activity
for public officials shows the various ways that officials have
confronted the remaining collective action problems. This
section aims to describe specifically how public officials are
using social networks in relation to their desires and values,
described above.
else in the political landscape) try to “free ride” by enjoying public goods
produced by others, and seek “rents,” or the ability to capture any excess
value that is produced by someone else‟s (or the public‟s) investment. The
theory is often summarized in the public choice context as the notion that
private, selfish interest, rather than public interest, drives the actions of both
individuals and groups. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
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First, public officials have adopted social networks for
outbound connections and communications—by which one
transmits information in a one-way manner to constituents.
The lowest-threshold options for this type of communication
are the establishment of a “profile” with information about
oneself and outward-directed posts viewable by either other
network members or the public at large.
More specifically, public officials use the “profile” portion of
social networking sites to craft a public image more textured
than possible in most traditional media. The mere act of
establishing a Facebook page, a blog, or a Twitter account
sends a message suggesting modernity, openness, and a
willingness to surrender some amount of privacy to viewers.
Identity is also conveyed by frequency and content of posts; a
public official can convey a hardworking image of a ubiquitous
or omnipresent public servant, for example, by posting about
her geographic location.
Outbound connections featuring only material that could
be found elsewhere are the lowest-threshold social network
communications and have many similarities to bulk emails or
mass mailings. Correspondingly, they are not valued highly by
other users. More complex are the combinations of outbound
and inbound connections that really distinguish social media
from traditional junk mail. As described above, public officials
attach significant value to inbound connections. The reason is
easy to identify—it is that an outbound connection includes
information about identity, but an inbound connection suggests
the existence of a relationship. Most commonly, public officials
use inbound connections to establish relationships with
constituents, and carry on those relationships in an exchange
of comments and posts on the public official‟s profile (whether
on Facebook, Twitter, or a blog). Although it is clear that the
dialogue between public officials and constituents establishes
and strengthens relationships, public officials have been
reluctant to incorporate online discourse into their formal
decision-making process.87

87. Chadwick states that “there is a marked reluctance on the part of
elected officials and public sector bureaucrats to enshrine deliberative online
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In addition, public officials appear interested in using
social networks to inform and motivate constituents around
specific issues—in other words, to generate the sense of
community that draws value from the cross-constituent
relationships.
As a general matter, public officials benefit from the
concentration (or concentrated availability) of information
about and generated by constituents that appears in social
networks.88 In this way, public officials capture rents from the
concentration of individuals volunteering information about
themselves. But the capture is non-exclusive; public officials
merely enjoy to an unusual degree this information as a public
good. And once the structure has been established, individual
users sign up without incremental cost, and each additional
user adds value to the network at large (value accruing to both
the elected official and the other users—the elected official gets
information from more sources and distributes more
information to more sources, while the individual user enjoys a
larger community of like-minded individuals).89
3. Dynamics Driven by Public Officials Using Social
Networks
The interests and activities of public officials on social
networks creates certain dynamics that affect other users
within the system. For example, public officials are bound to
have more inbound than outbound connections, placing a strain
on the officials‟ attention and driving her to use higherefficiency tools to maintain an online presence. In addition,
many of the benefits of social networks (such as access to
consultation into their routine modes of operation.” Chadwick, supra note 4,
at 16.
88. Id. (“[I]nformational value emerges from the confluence of
distributed user generated content and its centralized exploitation . . . In the
realm of political campaigns, e-government, and e-democracy, social
networking sites thus offer political actors many advantages over the open
web.”).
89. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 23-38 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al.
eds., 2006).
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others‟ personal information or access to their attention) are
concentrated in public officials in much the same way they are
concentrated in other “nodes.”
The activity patterns of public officials also create
incentives for other users. A public official who encourages
constituents to interact (whether by explicitly asking them to
or implicitly, by engaging with them when they do) is
expressing a demand that often provokes its own supply.
Similarly, a public official who cultivates a large collection of
constituents online may create a community of easily organized
users who may overcome other collective action problems.
In this way, public officials who initiate the use of social
networks are “political entrepreneurs” or leaders that offer
their constituencies an opportunity to overcome collective
action problems by engaging in the civic social network.90
These dynamics encourage a pattern of behavior in which, in
Shepsle‟s words, “particular individuals may make unusually
large contributions of time and energy and financial and
(especially) logistical resources not (only) because they care
passionately about the group‟s objective but (also) because they
see an opportunity to parlay this investment into something
personally (read: selectively) rewarding.”91
C.

Why Do Constituents Interact with Public Officials in Civic
Social Networks?

Public officials use online social networks simply because
constituents use them; without the ability to interact with
voters, the networks are useless. But why do constituents use
social networks to interact with public officials? The
motivations of users in general has been studied and described
at length elsewhere, and surely is the subject of intense,
around-the-clock advertising research.92 But do people take
90. Id. (citing Robert Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political
Entrepreneurs, in 1 PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION MAKING 161 (Gordon
Tolluck ed., 1966) and N. Frohlich et al., POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND
COLLECTIVE GOODS (1971)).
91. Id. at 31.
92. For a detailed analysis of user‟s general motivations in using social
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time away from playing Farmville, tagging photos, watching
piano-playing-cat videos, and stalking former significant others
to read and respond to a tweet from their city councilmember?
We know that they do93—but why?
The question is both theoretical and empirical. The
theoretical question is a familiar collective action problem—the
story of rational voter apathy, or the notion that low-level
political participation like voting or emailing an elected official
is a fundamentally irrational behavior. This story is an old one.
It goes like this:
If a citizen took the time to calculate the odds that her vote
would make the difference in any given election, she would find
that the possible benefit of having his or her views expressed
by the victor is far outweighed by the inconvenience of voting.
And if that citizen then took into account the possibility that
the elected official would, in fact, express the citizen‟s
preferences, and that the individual legislator‟s vote on that
matter would also make the difference in the legislature‟s
action, then the citizen‟s calculation of possible benefit would
be further reduced.94
The same reasoning applies to other low-threshold political
activities, such as writing a letter to elected officials or
participating in a rally—or connecting with public officials on
civic social networks. In nearly all cases, the probability that
an individual will have influence on actual policy is so small
that it cannot be justified by the individual effort required to
participate politically. Further exacerbating the situation is the
tendency of rational voters to free ride on the efforts of others:
if two voters want the same policy, each would do best to let the
other do the work of getting the policy adopted.95 At the same
networks, see Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1151.
93. Smith, supra note 12, at 26.
94. See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT; LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
95. All potential political action is beset by the free rider problem. See,
e.g., Mashaw, supra note 30, at 22 (“The crucially important question then is,
„Which groups will form and engage in political action?‟ Or to put it in other
terms, „How can the free rider problem be solved for groups who would be
better off if they could all act together to pursue policies that benefit the
group?‟”).
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time that public choice theory posits that rational voters will
refrain from low-threshold, low-reward political activity, it
predicts that constituents (or groups or corporations) will seek
to capture benefits created by others, especially where benefits
can be concentrated and costs distributed.
The rational choice argument against political
participation is worth repeating here not because it describes
what we observe in the real world; rather, it is helpful because
the differences between the rational model and the real world
tell us significant things about how the real world works and
how it can be governed. In the context of social networks, why
do people participate?
1. What Do Constituents Value When They Engage Public
Officials on Social Networks?
As with public officials, supra, this section first asks what
constituents value—essentially, what are they looking for when
they consider “friending” their mayor?96 The environment a
constituent encounters when considering the use of civic social
networks, however, is quite different. Unlike public officials,
most users of social networks were not prompted to join them
in order to communicate about politics or policy, and therefore
their social networking experience includes public officials as a
part, but not the most important part, of their experience. This
section, then, focuses only on those aspects of constituents‟
social networking that concern interaction between public
officials and their networks.
a. Identity and Expression
The first step in joining a social network is the creation of
an online profile, but a constituent‟s identity in the network
goes beyond basic personal information to include everything
the user does on the network. Users create and manage their
online identity as a means of expressing opinions, exercising
96. For a more detailed exploration of the motivations on an individual
user, see Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1151.
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influence, and distributing information.
The aspect of identity and expression that bears on civic
social networks is the fundamentally narcissistic behavior of
constituents—that is, the portion of the user‟s activity that
appears entirely self-absorbed or self-interested (in a way that
would make any public choice theorist proud). A self-interested
user will value anything that allows her to craft her identity
specifically and increases the power of her individual voice
relative to others. What makes this interesting from a public
choice perspective is that this narcissism creates public goods
because certain self-expressive (or self-indulgent) behaviors
have an identifiable connection to civic engagement: the
exercise of speech, self-governance, and associational liberty.
Papacharissi, drawing upon Inglehart and Welzel, wrote of a
“civically motivated narcissism,” based on the idea that “selfexpression values are connected to the desire to control one‟s
environment, a stronger desire for autonomy, and the need to
question authority” and that “self-expression values are not
uncivic.”97 Consequently, the exercise of purely self-interested
or narcissistic behavior can create public goods.
b. Relationships
Second, constituents greatly value the creation of
relationships, both with public officials and with other users.
The act of adding someone as a contact (or friend, or followee)
can have layers of significance: it can mean that the two users
are actually friends; that they are merely acquaintances; that
one is a “connector” or hub to many other users; a potential
business contact; or a fan or supporter.
Relationships have value, as well, because of their
reciprocal nature. As Grimmelmann points out, “[p]eople
reciprocate because it helps them solve collective-action
problems, because participation in a gift culture demands that

97. Chadwick, supra note 4, at 32 (citing Zizi Papacharissi, The Virtual
Sphere 2.0: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Beyond, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNET POLITICS 236-39 (Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard, eds.,
2008)).
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gifts be returned or passed along, because it‟s disrespectful to
spurn social advances, because there‟s a natural psychological
instinct to mirror what one‟s conversational partner is doing,
and because we learn how to conduct ourselves by imitating
others.”98
The creation of a relationship with a public official is
significant in distinct ways. It indicates an increase in
expressive power or voice, it also feeds the vanity or ego of the
user. In addition, it increases the perceived status of the
individual over those who do not share the same relationship.
In the context of such user-official connections, a user will
value authenticity, attention, responses, the prestige that
comes with a personal relationship, and real or perceived
influence.
Empirical research indicates that the connections on civic
social networks are not purely online or “virtual”; rather, they
tend to continue, further develop, or deepen a relationship from
offline.99
c. Community
Third, constituents value the community that arises from
the creation of relationships in civic social networks. For the
purposes of this analysis, the most salient characteristic of
community as developed by civic social networks is that they
reduce the costs of organizing among individuals in the
network to the vanishing point.100 The opportunity to create
affinity or advocacy groups with hardly any identifiable costs
has led to an explosion of lasting and temporary groups.
Although there is evidence that those participating in political
activities online are no different than those doing so offline, the
98. Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 1156.
99. Boyd, supra note 5 (citing Nicole B. Ellison et al., The Benefits of
Facebook “Friends": Exploring the Relationship Between College Students' use
of Online Social Networks and Social Capital, J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED
COMM.(1997), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue4/ellison.html).
100. Shirky, supra note 76, at 22 (“[M]ost of the barriers to group action
have collapsed, and without those barriers, we are free to explore new ways
of gathering together and getting things done.”).
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availability of impulsive or casual group formation is quite
different than what can take place offline.101
Communities are particularly easy to develop in this
environment because the indicia of commonality that can
prompt organization and grouping—politics, government, or
public affairs—is much stronger in the subgroup of people
using civic social networks than in the population at large.102
And the ease of group formation and organization, together
with the incentives for joining civic social networks, snowball
the benefits for joining the network for each new user,
reinforcing the “comedy of the commons”103 scenario. Any given
individual has incentive to increase his voice, gain attention,
and strengthen networks and community by creating an online
community.
d. Information
Constituents also use civic social networks for one purpose
distinct from voice, relationships, or community, but one that
feeds into all three: constituents value the availability and
acquisition of information. Much of this information stems from
the other aspects of social networking—the awareness of who is
in Councilmember Jones‟s network, or what issues are
significant to another constituent. And the somewhat
voyeuristic aspect of this access to information about civic
social networks arises from the desire for transparency and
accountability of public processes.
A few aspects of this are worth emphasizing: the nature of
information, when openly accessible, as a public good; the need
to filter or prioritize content in the event of information
overload; and the value of information for the twin public goals
101. Cf. Jessica T. Feezell et al., Facebook is . . . Fostering Political
Investment: A Study of Online Social Networking Groups and Offline
Participation, APSA TORONTO MEETING PAPER (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451456.
102. Shirky, supra note 76, at 199-200.
103. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (describing
social situations in which a “the more the merrier” dynamic prevails).
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of transparency and accountability.
Significantly, access to information is not a secretive or
private benefit in the context of civic social networks; because a
connection between two users must include a certain level of
access to information posted by each user, information is
integrated into every relationship in the network. Users may
value being the first to discover or post information, but the
value comes from the distribution of the information, not from
possessing it to the exclusion of others. In this way, the things
that public choice theorists might consider costs (becoming
informed about public issues, organizing groups) are actually
benefits that citizens enjoy when they act politically, and
things that public choice theorists might consider valuable only
if managed as a private good or rent, in fact, gain value when
treated as a public good.104
The access to information, however, has a downside in its
ubiquity; civic social networks simply contain too much
information for users to process. But the nature of the network
also creates value because it can prioritize, filter, or
contextualize the information. In other words, civic social
networks, by allowing users to see what is popular within their
network, help users mediate, sort, or personalize what is
otherwise an information overload.105
The type of information present on civic social networks
reveals a second downside, as well. As Feezell et al. noted,
Facebook encourages political participation but does not appear
to improve political knowledge: “Our content analysis indicates
that political Facebook group users often do not share much
new information and the information they do share tends to be
somewhat inaccurate, incoherent, or not very well supported
with evidence. As a forum for people to easily engage and share
their opinions, online groups are beneficial; however as a forum

104. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
105. This is not seen by all scholars as an unqualified good; as Perez
notes, such use of network recommendations leads to only reinforcing
existing beliefs, rather than deliberation or a better-informed citizenry. Oren
Perez, Complexity, Information Overload and Online Deliberation, 43 I/S: J.L.
& POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 57 n.39 (2008).
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to learn new political information online groups are ineffective
due in part to low quality wall discussion.”106
Regardless of the attempts to measure accuracy of political
knowledge, the availability of information on social networks is
valued highly by constituents for its role in accountability and
transparency. The information a user gleans from observing a
public official‟s activity in the civic social network helps the
constituent understand the official‟s behavior. In turn, the
information helps the user vote and make other political
decisions accordingly.107
The desire for information, and the drive to share it with
others on one‟s network, is closely related to the other values
expressed by constituents—identity, relationships, and
community. But, as discussed in part IV, infra, it has a
significant independent impact on the shape of the emerging
institution of civic social networks.108
2. Dynamics Driven by Constituent Behavior in Civic Social
Networks.
The values and activity patterns of constituents in civic
social networks create pressures and demands on other actors
in the networks. For example, the low costs or barriers to group
formation help overcome standard collective action obstacles to
cooperation, but also render group formation so easy that the
resulting organizations often have little impact as aggregators;
they have much greater impact as distributors.
Most prominently, the presence of millions of constituents
106. Feezell et al, supra note 101, at 14.
107. Perez, supra note 105, at 45 (Perez notes that “the increasing
importance of transparency in the common understanding of legitimate
governance. The doctrine of transparency has also become one of the more
influential principles of modern administrative law, greatly increasing the
amount of information available for democratic reflection.”).
108. Another part of this phenomenon is both the vagueness and the
specificity of the targeting of messages in social media. Even messages that
aren‟t directed at you gain a sort of personal content when they are publicly
available on social networking sites. For a general discussion of how usergenerated content is meaningful because of targeting, see Shirky, supra note
76, at 87-88.
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(and potential voters) on social networks, and the interest or
willingness of a substantial subset of those constituents to
engage with public officials online, creates a very strong
incentive for public officials to join the networks.
Once the official is in the network, however, the behavior
of constituents puts severe demands on public officials. The
ease with which constituents or organizations may access a
public official‟s attention using a social network leads to a very
high demand on the public official‟s attention and time;
consequently, officials themselves will seek to offer authenticity
and relationship-strengthening interaction only at a level that
is worth the time and effort. This behavior, in turn, reduces the
value of the interaction; just as public officials discount the
value of form emails, constituents discount the value of
inauthentic or impersonal communications by public
officials.109
In addition, the desire of constituents for transparency,
information, and accountability can put severe demands on
public officials and agencies that either cannot or would prefer
not to put all communications and documents online for use by
the network. Constituents will value highly all disclosure.
Indeed, they will resist efforts by public officials to shield
information from public view.
The use of civic social networks by constituents creates a
strong temptation for public officials to use the networks for
campaign activity as well. Constituents may not recognize the
distinction between official activity and political activity, but,
as discussed in section III.B.3, supra, the distinction is critical
for the prevention of corruption. There is no internal check on
such activity—neither public officials nor constituents will
punish or disincentivize campaign activity using a social
network account connected to a government link—and
therefore such behavior can only be prevented or punished by
external enforcement.

109. See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 4, at 28 (“Trust is one of the most
valuable and one of the most elusive forces in online politics.”); see also Perez,
supra note 105, at 58 (discussion of discount of email or webform-generated
comments).
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D. Social Networks Represent an Emerging Institutional
Environment
The rapid development of civic social networks belies the
existence of strong patterns of behavior by both constituents
and public officials in those networks. Those patterns, in turn,
demonstrate ways that civil social networks reinforce and
channel certain behaviors.110 Although the exact features and
brand names of social networks are bound to change, their
effect on interactions among constituents and public officials is
here to stay. The ways that civil social networks and behaviors
interact indicates that the networks are not just a tool, like
email or the telephone, but instead resemble an unstructured
institution like the press or lobbyists.111
1. What is an Unstructured Institution?
Public choice theory has developed at least two major ways
to think about institutions (often discussed under the subject
“rational choice institutionalism”). Under the first, institutions
are the set of rules and regulations constraining individuals‟,
groups‟, and firms‟ activities; the focus of inquiry is how players
choose to act under certain rules.112 The second view does not
assume the institutions as a given at all—instead, the rules are
agreed upon by the players themselves and can be changed
based on their pressures, preferences, and biases.113 The first

110. Clay Shirky quotes publisher Tim O‟Reilly calling social networks
“an architecture of participation.” Shirky, supra note 76, at 17.
111. Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the
Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 951 (1996), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x/pdf
(noting that “[a]nyone who has waited at a traffic light when no-one else was
around, however, has to admit that there are dimensions to the relationship
between institutions and actions that may not be highly instrumental or wellmodeled by rational choice theories.”).
112. Under this view, Kenneth Shepsle says that institutions are taken
“as exogenous constraints, or as an exogenously given game form.” Shepsle,
supra note 89, at 24.
113. Id.; see generally, THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
(1960) (discussing “focal” institutional arrangements).
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view describes a more specific, formal, structured institution,
like a government agency, a nonprofit organization, or a body
of law. The second view describes a conceptual, unstructured
institution, such as the press or the aggregated efforts of
advocacy organizations.114
Unstructured institutions are not established in any
formal sense; they emerge when parties‟ behavior is affected or
channeled by others‟ behavior and the demands and pressures
that the behavior creates. Under this theory, institutions are
changeable sets of norms that all or most people involved agree
upon; there are no rules per se, but actors behave as if there
are because they act strategically in response to their
expectations of others‟ behavior and other factors in the
environment. When expectations of behavior become
particularly clear and become less temporary, then this
behavior starts to look like an institution. This sort of
institution is a sort of equilibrium of behavior which, although
subject to change, is an identifiable pattern.115
2. Why is Civic Social Networking an Unstructured
Institution, and Why Should it Matter?
The behavior patterns and pressures discussed in sections
III.B and III.C indicate that civic social networks constitute an
emerging unstructured institution because they describe not
114. Shepsle uses the terms “structured” and “unstructured”
institutions. Shepsle, supra note 89, at 27-32. Of course, there are as many
ways to think about institutions as there are people who want to think about
institutions. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 111, at 949 (“If rational choice
theorists often posit a world of individuals or organizations seeking to
maximize their material well-being, sociologists frequently posit a world of
individuals or organizations seeking to define and express their identity in
socially appropriate ways . . . [S]ociological institutionalists argue that
organizations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it
advances the means-ends efficiency of the organization, but because it
enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its participants.”).
115. Shepsle, supra note 89, at 24-25 (noting the importance of Calvert
and Schotter to this second conception). See generally Randall L. Calvert,
Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 57 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995); Andrew Schotter, THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981).
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just the use of a new communication tool, but a set of strategic
behaviors and pressures. Those behaviors and pressures are
critical to understand for local governments attempting to
regulate public officials‟ use of civic social networks.
Not all the “rules” of civic social networking are provided
by the public officials and constituents; of course, the structure
and the features of the software itself establish constraints on
behavior.116 But the existence of such third-party rules does not
limit the voluntariness or strategic nature of the parties‟
activity. This is especially true given the many different social
networking options available.117
The recognition of the institutional nature of civic social
networks is not just an exercise in labeling, but rather has
significant implications for policymakers seeking to regulate
public officials‟ use of those networks. Civic social networking
is not just another tool to which the existing laws may apply,
like email or text messaging; rather, it is an environment that
has an impact on the behavior of the actors surrounding it.118
The interdependent strategic behaviors of public officials
and constituents in civic social networks guarantee, for
example, that there will always be a strong incentive for a
public official to join social networks, but that such an
incentive will lag behind constituent adoption of the social
network site unless the public official takes on the burden of
the political entrepreneur. Similarly, there will be strong
incentives for public officials to engage in some actual
116. For example, to connect to a public official on Facebook, a user must
list that person as a “friend” or become a “fan” of that official—labels that a
critical constituent might resist. One constituent testified before the Seattle
Ethics & Elections Commission that he resented declaring himself a “friend”
of a public official merely to have access to that official‟s Facebook feed.
Timothy Burgess, Councilmember, City of Seattle, Speech at the Meeting of
the Seattle Ethics and Elections Comm. (Dec. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.seattlechannel.org/videos/video.asp?ID=5590985.
117. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 111, at 945 (“The process of institutional
creation usually revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant actors;
and, if the institution is subject to a process of competitive selection, it
survives primarily because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors
than alternate institutional forms.”).
118. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 10 (2009).
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interactive behavior on the social network site, lest
constituents ignore the public official the same way they ignore
junk mail and unsolicited bulk email (spam). To the extent
public officials engage in interactive communication, the
overwhelming incentive is for the public official to display the
communication to other users so that the maximum exposure is
achieved for the spent effort. Similarly, constituents engaged in
civic social networks experience low-threshold group formation
and organizational tools, as well as a certain incentive for
acquiring information and sharing it with other users.
Constituents can frame their civic social network as any
portion (or no portion) of their overall social network according
to their preferences.
Institutions behave differently than mere tools because
these bargains or strategic behaviors by public officials and
constituents tend to funnel activity in certain directions. In the
case of civic social networks, it indicates that transparency and
accountability will be highly incentivized.
IV. Transparency and Accountability in the New Public
Square
A.

Civic Social
Accountability

Networks

Foster

Transparency

and

Our idealized notion of “the public sphere” conceives of
public discourse as a deliberative, rational conversation that
contributes to public policy and the practical structure
necessary to carry it out. Habermas famously envisioned the
public sphere as an arena where people collectively form public
opinion in an environment without the interference of the
government or the economy.119 Despite the high hopes of some
early Internet enthusiasts that the web would realize
Habermas‟s vision of universal access and pure discourse, the
web‟s record on elevating or deepening discourse is decidedly
119. Jurgen Habermas, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas
Burger Trans., The MIT Press 1989) (1962).
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mixed.120
But if the Internet (including civic social networks) has not
produced a more reasoned and balanced public debate, then
consider a narrower and more limited claim: civic social
networks, by bringing public officials and constituents into an
open public square, foster government transparency and
accountability.121
The metaphor of civic social networks as the “new public
square” does not aim for the loft of the public sphere; it makes
no claim to heighten discourse. Rather, its defining feature is
open space in full view of the public for anyone who wants it. If
one chooses to enter the public square, one consciously exposes
oneself to anything else there—music, speech, governance,
politics. And in particular, those public officials who enter the
public square do so with much at stake: reputation, familiarity,
ridicule, and re-election. By entering the public square,
whether to stand on a soapbox and preach or sit on a bench and
listen, a public official is engaging in her job, which under even
a jaded vision of informed democracy involves some
combination of transparency and accountability. In civic social
networks, public officials hear from and speak to constituents
in full view of the online world. Constituents can deliver
information, opinions, support, and opposition to those officials,
and constituents can interact with each other, forming groups
to advance shared interests. The ease with which
communications from and interactions with public officials are
available to the public demonstrates that, in this environment,
the contours of the institution itself make FOIA requests
obsolete, and includes constituents in the deliberative process
at a much deeper level than notice of or attendance at a formal
meeting would.
The access to information and the tools to hold officials
accountable is not an accident. The description of the
institutional environment, supra at sections III.A through
120. See generally Sunstein, supra note 11.
121. By “transparency,” I mean the ability of any citizen to obtain
information about what his government is doing or considering doing. By
“accountability,” I mean the ability of that citizen to affect the actions or
considerations of the government.
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III.D, indicates that public officials will be under constant
pressure for more disclosure, more information, and more
attention to constituents and groups. The advantages of group
formation will easily outweigh the obstacles and the incentives
for public sharing of information and announcements are high.
B.

Ejecting Public Officials from the New Public Square
Reduces Transparency and Accountability

It is particularly perverse, then, that objections to public
officials‟ use of civic social networks are based on the fear of
violating open meeting and public records laws. Prohibitions or
certain limits on the use of civic social networks—that is,
ejecting public officials from the new public square—would
result in less public deliberation, fewer publicly accessible
records, and elimination of valuable tools to hold public officials
accountable for their actions.
As discussed in Part II, open meeting, public records, and
misuse of government resource laws exist in every state, and
with good reason. The statutes work on two levels. Their
immediate goals are to make information about what the
government does and considers accessible, and to ensure that
government funds are not misused.122 But those immediate
122. See, e.g., Wash. Open Public Meetings Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
42.30.010 (1971) (“The legislature finds and declares that all public
commissions, boards, councils, committees, subcommittees, departments,
divisions, offices, and all other public agencies of this state and subdivisions
thereof exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of
this chapter that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be
conducted openly.”); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242
(1978) (“[t]he basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry,
vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”). FOIA is
“often explained as a means for citizens to know „what their government is up
to.‟” NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-72 (2004) (quoting DOJ v. Reporters
Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)); Wash. Public
Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2007) (“The people of this state do
not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in
delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide
what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.
The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over
the instruments they have created.”).
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goals also advance other important aims; making information
accessible is important, but the information only takes on
meaning when it is used to hold public officials accountable, or
to prevent a monopoly on inside information that would give
some citizens an exclusive advantage other others. Similarly,
the restrictions on the use of government resources for private
or political gain have, at one level, a fiscally prudent purpose
(that is, barring spending that does not advance a legitimate
purpose of government). However, the more important
consideration is preventing an environment where a private
corporation or a campaign can enjoy a limited benefit to the
exclusion of others.
Civic social networks advance all of these primary and
secondary goals. Communications that would go unrecorded
outside of the new public square (such as a face-to-face
discussion or a telephone conversation) are not only
documented but instantly accessible to the public when they
occur in a civic social network. Attempts to get a public
official‟s attention to hold her accountable are easily accessible,
and the threshold expense to organize a group of constituents
is virtually zero. In short, civic social networks substantially
improve public access to deliberative discussion and the records
created by it.123
Importantly, the use of civic social networks by public
officials also helps reduce moral hazard associated with hidden
action. This hazard appears where a strategic agent—the
public official—may take action that isn‟t observable by the
principal—the constituency.124 Civic social networks cannot, of
course, eliminate the many ways that public officials can hide
actions or statements (for example, in a private conversation),
but to the extent that communications in the network are
available to the public, the opportunity for constituents to
investigate officials‟ actions and statements is greatly
improved.
123. Communication, after all, is hydraulic—it will flow where it is
unrestricted. And to bar communication from a forum in which it is
transparent would only have the effect of hiding such communication from
public view.
124. For a more complete discussion, see Shepsle, supra note 89.
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C. Local Governments Need to Adapt
Where an attempt to apply existing laws to a new
institutional environment would run counter to the purposes of
those laws, local policymakers should adapt. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to prescribe specific adaptations—and I
expect that it may take some experimentation for local
governments to arrive at a comprehensive solution, if there is
one—but the general outlines of a near-term adaptation are
clear.
First, local governments can solve the practical problems
associated with public records statutes. Retention and storage
of Facebook and Twitter feeds, for example, are no more
complicated than saving screen shots, web page images, or
even printing out a paper copy on a routine schedule.
Inexpensive or free software solutions already exist for most
such applications.
Second, policymakers should adopt interpretations of Open
Meetings statutes (or amend the statutes themselves) to make
clear what aspects of written communication constitute a
“meeting.” The twin purposes of open meeting and public
record statutes overlap significantly and raise interesting
questions about when the availability of records is sufficient,
and when actual presence at an exchange of those records is
necessary. The doctrinal question—resolved by the Virginia
court by a close analysis of the immediacy of the exchange of
emails—also involves what we mean by “deliberation” and
what types of government action trigger meeting requirements.
But
policymakers
should
ensure
that
when
city
councilmembers interact with each other or the public in full
view of a civic social network, but no votes are taken or
collective decisions are made, the purposes of the open meeting
statutes are fulfilled to a greater extent than they would be if
that interaction was barred.
Third, local governments should recognize that, to the
extent public officials allow government resources to connect to
constituent posts (or third-party advertising), the content of
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that posting and advertising constitutes a limited public forum
and is not imputed to the government.125 As civic social
networks are the new public square, the mere presence of
public officials in the square should not impute authorship of
all third-party content in the square to the government any
more than signs on the sidewalk or constituent letters received
and retained by agencies are imputed to the government.
Certainly minimal standards of civility can be enforced, as in
any limited public forum, but forbidding third-party political
content is neither wise nor practical—and barring public
officials from civic social networks where such content is
possible would have the effect of ejecting them from the public
square.
Conclusion
A revolution is underway, and it is changing the ways that
constituents and their public officials interact. It is not just a
change in the tools used—from the letter to the email—but it is
a change in the methods and incentives and costs that underlie
that interaction in a more fundamental way. Just as the
sunshine laws evolved with the ability of government to retain
and produce information, those laws must again evolve to
permit public officials and constituents to engage in the new
public square of civic social networks.

125. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for
Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149
(1998). For a comprehensive analysis of public forum law on civic social
networks, see Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0 (forthcoming 2011).
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